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The link between government performance and support for incumbents is a key mechanism of accountable
government. We model the vote share of incumbent administrations in local government as proportional and
nonproportional responses to public service performance. We evaluate the models using a panel data set covering
performance and elections from 2001 to 2007 in English local governments where an incumbent party or coalition
was up for reelection. We control for the previous vote, whether the incumbent administration is of the national
governing party, and local economic conditions. We find evidence for a nonproportional, performance threshold
hypothesis, which implies that voters’ behavior is affected by clear gradations of performance. Only the difference
between low performance and at least mediocre performance matters. There is no reward for high performance.
Instead our findings suggest negativity bias in the relationship between performance and electoral support for
incumbents.
S
tudies of economic voting have long found that,
depending on context, incumbents are often
held responsible for macro-economic perform-
ance and are rewarded or punished accordingly (e.g.,
Dorussen and Taylor 2002; Duch and Stevenson
2006; van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007).
Just as citizens encounter economic outcomes, it is
increasingly recognized that they evaluate many other
aspects of government performance that affect their
lives, such as providing education, allocating welfare,
and maintaining the environment. With citizens pay-
ing higher attention to valence (Clarke et al. 2004) and
less attention to ideological distance, punishment and
reward for service performance would seem to be an
increasingly important element of vote choice.
Extant studies of performance evaluation focus
on the national level (Bartle 2003; Johnston and
Pattie 2001), but government services are often
provided, experienced, and consumed in local envi-
ronments where local politicians and bureaucrats
make decisions about their quality. There have been
few studies of performance evaluation in local con-
tests and, more generally, little research on retro-
spective voting in local elections.1 Exceptions are
school board elections in the United States where
there is support for performance voting (Berry and
Howell 2007) and U.S. suburban administrations
where voters who view performance positively are
less likely to support challengers to incumbents
(Oliver and Ha 2007, 401–02).
We analyze the form of the relationship between
local public service performance and electoral sup-
port for local incumbents. In contrast to the economy
where a few headline measures, notably inflation and
unemployment, dominate debate, government serv-
ices have multiple measures of performance, ranging
from crime rates and school performance league
tables to measures of bureaucratic efficiency. But
England uniquely has an official categorization of
local service performance according to five broad,
*Author order is alphabetical: all make an equal contribution to the article.
1Berry and Howell (2007, 845) find that fewer than 1% of 212 articles on elections in leading U.S. political science journals address local
elections, and none address retrospective voting.
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summary scores from poor to excellent service
provision that can give a signal to voters. So we can
ask: Do local electorates respond to fine-grained
continuous governmental assessments of perform-
ance or citizen perceptions in a linear way? Do elec-
torates respond to summary scores that provide
categorization according to the level of performance?
Are there performance threshold effects? Is there
evidence of positivity or negativity bias?
To address these questions, we use the case of
English local government which presents a tough test
for theories of performance voting because, unlike
most U.S. local elections, party labels are very im-
portant. Local elections are, to an extent, opinion polls
on national incumbents, which make them second-
order elections, linked to what is going on in the
national contest (Miller 1988; Rallings, Thrasher, and
Denver 2005; Reif and Schmitt 1980). If performance
voting is still found in this context, it is a phenomenon
potentially of broad relevance. We assess proportional
and nonproportional specifications using aggregate
data to estimate the percentage of the vote for the
incumbent administration. In a proportional model,
incumbent electoral support is positively and linearly
related to performance, whereas in a nonproportional
model electoral support only changes in response to
large changes or deteriorations. Given the importance
of unobserved heterogeneity across government units
and the possible bias this may introduce, we use panel
data for multiple elections rather than modeling
each round of elections separately (Berry and Howell
2007).
Theories of Performance and
Support for Elected Incumbents
The allocation of responsibility for policymaking is
increasingly noted as an influence on electors’ responses
to policy, including economic, outcomes (Anderson
2000; Stein 1990). It is often hard for citizens to
observe accurately the marginal adjustments in the
aggregates of employment, inflation, and economic
activity that result from the policy instruments of
particular governments rather than other sources. By
contrast, electors might take more account of local
service performance in local elections where the
responsible public bureaucracies are under direct
control by politicians and are engaged in a much
more limited range of activities than national, re-
gional, or state governments. In this article we analyze
the relationship between performance and electoral
support for local incumbents over time. We examine
which form of performance has a relationship with
support for incumbents, distinguishing between gov-
ernmental perceptions of performance as captured
in managerial indicators and citizen perceptions of
performance as measured by the satisfaction with
overall services provided. Satisfaction measures are
influenced by, amongst other factors, perceived per-
formance of government services and expectations as
revealed by sample surveys of satisfaction with services
and can differ greatly from managerial measures (James
2009; Stipak 1980; Van Ryzin et al. 2004). Our research
helps shed light on what kind of performance measure
has electoral ramifications.
We examine performance and incumbents’ elec-
toral support in two sets of models. First, the propor-
tional or linear response to performance model suggests
a continuous relationship between performance and
support for incumbents, with electors watching care-
fully the actions of the governed, and voting accordingly
when the opportunity comes. This linear specification is
similar to the thermostatic model of the opinion-policy
relationship that suggests voters examine the difference
between the level of policy provided by government and
their preferred level (Soroka and Wlezien 2005; Wlezien
1995).
Second, the nonproportional response to perform-
ance models draw on research suggesting that elector-
ates do not respond to potential stimuli, notably
changes in economic conditions, in a linear way. One
strand of work suggests that this is because voters are
often not well informed about policy issues and may
not notice fine-grained differences (Anderson 2000;
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Previous research on
English local government has shown that the intro-
duction of a performance information system provid-
ing local voters with a simple summary of the level of
each government’s performance acted as a shock to
incumbent support in the following local election.
Armed with the new public performance information,
voters exhibited negativity bias, punishing the poor
performing incumbents but not giving equivalent
reward to top performers (James and John 2007).
The analysis presented here extends this insight to
assess the relationship between levels of performance
and electoral support over time, examining whether
performance matters only when certain threshold
levels of performance are crossed, and examining
nonproportionality in terms of whether only relatively
large increases or declines in performance matter.
We adopt a conditional approach common in
recent studies of economic voting that find context
alters the relationships between economic variables
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and election outcomes (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000).
The competitiveness of the election is potentially im-
portant: higher competitiveness could strengthen the
relationship between performance and electoral sup-
port. Under the condition of high competition the
local opposition becomes a viable alternative to the
incumbent administration whereas under low compe-
tition the incumbent does not face such a risk. In
addition, the news media influence the reporting of
performance information as shown in U.S. school
board elections (Berry and Howell 2007). We examine
the tone of local media coverage of performance as a
moderating influence. Developing the approach of
James and John (2007), we suggest voters react to the
extent the media report net positive news stories about
performance.
We consider other factors likely to be important
influences on incumbent support: local economic
conditions and fiscal performance measured by the
level of local taxes. Research on the U.S. federal
system suggests that voters attribute state-level eco-
nomic conditions to decisions by national politicians
rather than their state governor (Stein 1990). Johnston
et al. (2000) show that local economic conditions
affect incumbent evaluation for national elections in
England and Wales, which further suggests national
rather than local attribution of responsibility. Never-
theless, since local government has some influence on
the local economy, we include local economic per-
formance as a potential influence on the electoral
support for an incumbent administration. We also
include local property values. Fischel (2001) argues
that the fate of local incumbents in the United States
depends in part on whether homes maintain their
value. Local electorates tend to reject policies that
lead to reductions in the value of property. Since
England has a high rate of homeownership, we expect
the same relationship.
Fiscal performance has been noted as an influ-
ence on voting in state and local, as well as national,
contexts. Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel (1995) and
Lowry, Alt, and Ferree (1998) find that voters hold
U.S. governors to account for the level of state taxes,
although the evidence is not clear cut (Glaser and
Hildreth 1996). Martinussen (2004) finds support for
local economic and fiscal voting in Norway. In
England, some argue that voters punish government
with high taxation rates while others claim that the
public has a redistributionalist point of view (Hall
and Preston 2000). Also, grants from central to local
government mainly determine local tax rates because
they take up 75% of local revenue, weakening local
fiscal accountability. However, Gibson has challenged
the conventional wisdom that local taxes do not affect
voting behavior (Gibson 1988, 1994). We examine ev-
idence relevant to this argument.
The English local elections are not fully distinct
from broader national politics, and local incumbent
parties’ electoral support is influenced by national
factors (Miller 1988). While the local parties have a
high degree of autonomy, such as over the selection
of candidates, they run under the banner and author-
ity of the national party organization. Given the
prominence of national issues, voters’ opinions about
national government have strong effects on their
support for local incumbent administrations, with
unpopularity conventionally seen as having a neg-
ative impact on the local party if it is the same as that
of the national incumbent, and a positive impact if
not. Even though local elections are second order,
having a lower level of importance than national
contests, voters are still capable of making judgments
about the local incumbent administrations (Rallings
and Thrasher 1997). Similar to the controversy about
local economic voting, this dispute is also addressed
by our data.
Methods and Data
The best way to test the relationship between public
service performance and electoral choice is with data
from successive time periods. It is rare to find such
cases because performance management systems are
temporary and succeed each other with bewildering
regularity. Yet local government in England has the
same performance data for its units over a reasonably
long time period, providing some unique advantages
for our study. Since 2002 there has been a publicly
available officially assessed measure of performance
for each local government: the Comprehensive Per-
formance Assessment (CPA) issued by the Audit
Commission, an independent monitoring body. The
CPA summarizes an array of performance measures
into five broad-based scores ranging from a zero- to a
four-star rating (Audit Commission 2002; Broadbent
2003).2
Moreover, English local governments exclusively
provide a set of nationally prescribed local services
and little else. The overwhelming majority of expen-
diture is on mandated services, and there are statutory
limitations and financial disincentives to providing other
services. The local electoral system is first-past-the-post,
2These five categories were formerly known as poor, weak, fair,
good, and excellent.
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where the vote for candidates from each political party
within each electoral district or ward is clear. These
features promote a strong link between voting and
rewarding or punishing incumbent administrations be-
cause there is usually one party in control.
Data and Variables
Our data are from upper-tier local governments
(London boroughs, metropolitan districts, shire
counties, and unitary authorities), which are respon-
sible for education, social services, regulatory services
(such as land use planning and waste management),
housing, libraries, leisure services, and welfare bene-
fits. Data have been collected from Local Election
Handbooks (Rallings and Thrasher, 2000–07), the
BBC local elections coverage, the ‘‘Political Control
in Great Britain’’ maps issued by the consultancy
PPS, the Audit Commission, the Office of National
Statistics, and the Department of Communities and
Local Government.
Our dependent variable is the electoral support
for the incumbent administration expressed as a per-
centage of the total vote. In the case of councils that
were controlled by a single party in the year before
the election under consideration, this variable con-
tains the vote share of that party. For councils that
were controlled by a coalition of two or more parties
in the year before the election under consideration,
this variable contains the sum of the vote shares of
those major parties (Labour, Conservative and Lib-
eral Democrat) involved in the coalition in the year
before. We chose to look at electoral support for the
incumbent administration rather than whether or not
the incumbent administration was reelected because
the latter would only be an indirect indicator of elec-
toral judgment on the incumbent administration.
This is due to the electoral system, which frequently
produces a substantial divergence between the vote
share of a party and the seat share it wins on the
council (Rallings and Thrasher 1997, 110–15).
We use three measures of performance. The first
indicator is the service performance score, a summary
measure of performance theoretically ranging from 0
(worst) to 100 (best). It is based on a range of
managerial performance information, including Best
Value Performance Indicators, which the law requires
each local authority to provide, and covers all major
public services (e.g., education, housing, social serv-
ices, transport, planning, waste collection) and en-
compasses dimensions of performance such as service
quantity, quality, and effectiveness. The Audit Com-
mission carries out checks of the accuracy of these
indicators. Our second indicator is the Comprehensive
Performance Assessment (CPA). The CPA is derived in
equal parts from the service performance score and
judgments by Audit Commission inspectors on a local
government’s ability to improve, forming a summary
rating of a local government’s performance. In other
words, the CPA envelops the service performance
score. The five levels of the rating are: zero stars, one
star, two stars, three stars, and four stars. Our CPA
measure is made up of two dummy variables: the first
representing a CPA rating of two stars and the second
representing a CPA rating of three stars or four stars.
The two lowest CPA ratings, zero stars and one star,
form the base (left out) category. Finally, for citizen
perceptions of performance, we use the percentage of
citizens stating that they are satisfied or very satisfied
with the overall services provided by their local
government. These data are also nationally mandated
and are gathered from large random sample surveys
carried out every three years. The Audit Commission
then independently verifies the reliability of these
data. Our indicator is based on the three waves of the
survey carried out in 2000–01, 2003–04, and 2006–07.
All performance indicators are lagged by one year3 as
they are generally collected later in the year than
elections take place, and in the case of the CPA—the
one performance measure easily available to the
general public—published toward the end of a calen-
dar year, more than half a year later than elections
take place.
We use the vote share of the current incumbent
party or coalition in the last election to control for
persistence of political support because there is likely
to be a fraction of voters with strong partisanship in
every council. In the case of councils that were con-
trolled by a single party in the year before the election
under consideration, this variable contains the vote
share of that party in the election preceding the
election under consideration. In the case of councils
that were controlled by a coalition of two or more
parties in the year before the election under consid-
eration, this variable contains the sum of the vote
shares of those major parties (Labour, Conservatives,
Liberal Democrats) involved in the coalition. This
measure is not equivalent to a lagged dependent
variable because the current incumbent party or coa-
lition in many cases (27 council-years in the propor-
tional and threshold models reported in Tables 1 and 2)
3Since there are only three waves of the aggregate citizen
satisfaction indicator, it is lagged one year if there was an election
in the next year, otherwise two or three years, depending on when
the next election was held.
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was not the incumbent previously but was in the
opposition. As a result, this variable does not suffer
from the bias associated with using lagged dependent
variables in fixed-effects models.
We introduce a number of control variables to
exclude some alternative explanations for how well
the incumbent administration does at the polls. First,
since the local elections in England are second order
to the national system, we control for the effect of a
local incumbent party also governing nationally by
including a dummy variable to indicate Labour coun-
cils. Further, we also create a dummy variable to in-
dicate Liberal Democrat councils, as this party is the
perennial opposition party of British national politics
and sometimes benefits locally when the national
government is held in low esteem while at other times
Liberal Democrat councils may be punished for the
unpopularity of their national party.
We control for characteristics of the local elec-
tions that may affect the performance/incumbent
support relationship. We include a dummy variable
for whole council elections (as opposed to elections
by thirds) to take into account the difference in the
perceived importance of these elections to voters—
especially since voters will feel they are more likely to
achieve a change in political control when all the
councilors are up for election rather than just a third
of them. Some elections are more competitive than
others, as a party may enjoy a comfortable majority in
one council but barely maintain control in another. We
therefore include the closeness of the last election as an
explanatory variable. Closeness is defined as the per-
centage point difference between the vote share of the
party gaining the largest number of votes and the vote
share of the party gaining the second largest number of
votes.
TABLE 1 Explaining Vote Share of the Incumbent Administration by Service Performance
Score—Proportional and Positivity vs. Negativity Models
Proportional
model
Positivity vs.
negativity model
Service performance score before the election 0.018 (0.065)
Service performance score increased by 1/3 std. deviation
or more before the election
1.202 (0.923)
Service performance score declined by 1/3 std. deviation
or more before the election
1.184 (1.059)
Competitiveness: difference in vote share of two biggest
parties in the last election
20.130 (0.062)** 20.261 (0.067)***
% support for current incumbent in the previous election 0.819 (0.080)*** 0.747 (0.100)***
Labour (national governing party) incumbent (dummy) 22.791 (1.227)** 24.770 (1.723)***
Liberal Democratic incumbent (dummy) 23.616 (1.658)** 20.017 (2.270)
Whole-council election (dummy) 27.635 (2.157)*** 20.907 (4.216)
Average first-quarter claimant rate 21.991 (1.236) 21.274 (1.982)
Average home price in the financial year before the election
(in £1,000)
20.064 (0.086) 0.152 (0.130)
Average council tax/dwelling (in £) 20.009 (0.016) 20.016 (0.029)
Year dummy for 2004 3.212 (2.729)
Year dummy for 2005 8.279 (3.255)** 9.684 (5.276)*
Year dummy for 2006 4.894 (4.111) 20.090 (6.431)
Year dummy for 2007 5.454 (4.967) 20.958 (7.423)
Constant 30.726 (17.474)* 4.469 (26.939)
Observations 276 212
Number of local governments 134 131
F-test of H0: ‘‘The model explains nothing’’ p , .0001 p , .0001
R2 within .67 .68
R2 between .19 .19
R2 overall .32 .17
Fixed effects results with Huber-White standard errors adjusted for clustering on each local government in parentheses. Note that the
coefficient on the constant term reflects the average local government fixed effect plus all idiosyncrasies of the 2003 election in case of
the proportional model and the 2004 election in case of the positivity vs. negativity model.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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We further control for factors other than public
service performance that may affect voters’ judgments.
Following the economic voting literature and to capture
general economic conditions, we use the percentage of
the working-age population claiming job seekers’ allow-
ance (the claimant rate) in the first quarter of an election
year. This variable comes from the United Kingdom
Office of National Statistics, from which we obtained the
claimant rates for January, February, and March of each
year and then took their mean. We use data on the first
quarter because it precedes the election and voters
should be most attentive to the economic situation they
recently encountered. This variable is a proxy for the
unemployment rate, which is not collected annually at
the local government level. It is a very good proxy: the
correlation between the unemployment rate at local
government level from the 2001 census with the claimant
rate for the first quarter of that year (our indicator) is .96
(92% of the variance in the claimant rate is explained by
the unemployment rate).
To test whether the ‘Homevoter Hypothesis’
(Fischel 2001)—the theoretical argument that local
incumbent administration’s fate depends to a signifi-
cant part on whether homes maintain their value—
TABLE 2 Explaining Vote Share of the Incumbent Administration by the Comprehensive Performance
Assessment (CPA) Grades—Threshold and Positivity vs. Negativity Models
Threshold model
Positivity vs.
negativity model
Reward
formulation
Extremes
formulation
Mediocre performance before the election:
CPA 2 stars (dummy)
3.401 (1.188)***
High performance before the election:
CPA 3 or 4 stars (dummy)
3.879 (1.689)** 0.478 (1.100)
Low performance before the election:
CPA 0 or 1 stars (dummy)
23.401 (1.188)***
CPA improvement (dummy) 20.500 (0.845)
CPA worsening (dummy) 22.291 (1.350)*
Competitiveness: difference in vote share
of two biggest parties in the last election
20.132 (0.055)** 20.132 (0.055)** 20.251 (0.065)***
% support for current incumbent in the
previous election
0.828 (0.079)*** 0.828 (0.079)*** 0.787 (0.098)***
Labour (national governing party)
incumbent (dummy)
22.830 (1.235)** 22.830 (1.235)** 23.690 (1.829)**
Liberal Democratic incumbent (dummy) 23.526 (1.803)* 23.526 (1.803)* 0.967 (2.341)
Whole-council election (dummy) 27.116 (2.119)*** 27.116 (2.119)*** 22.010 (4.057)
Average first-quarter claimant rate 22.692 (1.263)** 22.692 (1.263)** 21.567 (2.137)
Average home price in the financial year
before the election (in £1,000)
20.069 (0.073) 20.069 (0.073) 0.152 (0.141)
Average council tax/dwelling (in £) 20.008 (0.014) 20.008 (0.014) 20.016 (0.026)
Year dummy for 2004 2.450 (2.587) 2.450 (2.587)
Year dummy for 2005 7.473 (2.878)** 7.473 (2.878)** 6.586 (5.341)
Year dummy for 2006 4.182 (3.461) 4.182 (3.461) 20.323 (6.471)
Year dummy for 2007 4.607 (4.089) 4.607 (4.089) 21.640 (7.482)
Constant 30.552 (15.597)* 33.953 (15.755)** 5.672 (27.449)
Observations 276 276 212
Number of local governments 134 134 131
F-test of H0: ‘‘The model explains nothing’’ p , .0001 p , .0001 p , .0001
R2 within .69 .69 .69
R2 between .17 .17 .19
R2 overall .31 .31 .19
Fixed effects results with Huber-White standard errors adjusted for clustering on each local government in parentheses. Note that the
coefficient on the constant term reflects the average local government fixed effect plus all idiosyncrasies of the 2003 election in case of
the threshold model and the 2004 election in case of the positivity vs. negativity model.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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holds in England, we include the average value of all
homes sold in the local government’s jurisdiction in
the financial year (April 1–March 31) immediately
preceding the election (held in May or June). This
variable comes from the U.K. Land Registry, a
governmental agency that maintains title records,
including sale prices, on all properties in the country.
We control for the level of tax levied by the local
government. We include the average council tax per
dwelling (in £) from the election year as an explan-
atory variable. Council tax rates for the election year
are known well in advance before the election takes
place. The hypothesis is that electors will punish
relatively high levels of council tax (Brender 2003).
Model Specification
We estimate models to evaluate different conceptual-
izations of the relationship between performance and
support for the incumbent administration. Our in-
terest in incumbent support means that councils that
are not under any party’s control in any of the years
covered by our data (as is the case in 9 out of 148
local governments) are not included. All our specifi-
cations are variations of the following generic model:
Electoral supportit5 b f ðperform:Þi; t1
þ other factors þ random shocks
In other words, we explain the incumbent admin-
istration’s electoral support as a function of public
service performance as well as other observed and
unobserved factors and random shocks. The sub-
script i stands for the local government and the
subscript t stands for the year, where t-1 indicates a
one-year lag. Finally, and most importantly, perform-
ance enters the equation inside an unspecified func-
tion f(), which means that it can do so in any way,
linearly or not and with or without thresholds. The
core hypothesis of this article is that b is not zero—in
other words, that public service performance matters
in some way for how the incumbent administration
fares at the polls.
Proportional Response to
Performance Model
For the proportional response to performance model,
the sets of performance variables discussed thus far
are simply entered linearly into the specification:
Electoral supportit5 b perform:i; t1 þ other factors
þ random shocks
Nonproportional Response to
Performance Models
For the nonproportional response to performance
models, we create variations of the sets of perform-
ance variables discussed thus far. Performance could
affect support for the incumbent administration in a
nonproportional way if only relatively large increases
or declines in performance matter, or if performance
matters only when a threshold is crossed. We now
discuss both of these possibilities.
Positivity Bias versus Negativity Bias
In this version of the nonproportional model, elec-
tors do not react to small changes of performance but
to relatively large jumps. This model allows us to test
for evidence of negativity bias, i.e., the electorate
placing a larger weight on negative rather than pos-
itive information (Lau 1982, 1985; Soroka 2006). The
equation looks rather similar to the proportional
response model, namely:
Electoral supportit5 b1 large perform:increasei; t1
þ b2large perform:decreasei; t1
þ other factors
þ random shocks
but the twist lies in the new terms large performance
increase and decrease, which we define as dummy
variables:
Large perform:increasei; t1[
1 if Dperform:i; t1 . d sdðperform:iÞ
0 otherwise
;

and Large perform:decreasei; t1[
1 if Dperform:i; t1 , d sdðperform:iÞ
0 otherwise
;

where D performancei, t-1 denotes the first difference
(performancei, t-1 – performancei, t-2), sd(performancei)
denotes the within local government standard devia-
tion of performance, and d .0 denotes a multiplier
that indicates the fraction or multiple of a standard
deviation that defines ‘‘large.’’ We set d 5 1/3 be-
cause a change of more than one third of a standard
deviation in the service performance score is of ap-
proximately similar magnitude to a change of one star
in the CPA (which differs in having clear categories and
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being based on auditor judgment, not just indicator
scores).
Performance Thresholds
Rather than reacting to change along a continuum of
performance, voters may only react if performance
exceeds or falls below a certain clearly labeled stand-
ard because there needs to be a significant external
stimulus to draw attention to the voter of a change in
performance whereas they are less likely to notice the
small increments that are typical of the proportional
model. The performance thresholds hypothesis can
be modeled using indicators for different discrete
levels of performance.
We test all specifications against data on govern-
mental perceptions of performance. Table 1 contains
a test of the proportional and the positivity versus
negativity model using the service performance score.
Table 2 contains tests of the threshold model and the
positivity versus negativity model using the CPA.
Citizen perceptions of performance as measured by
the satisfaction survey can only be meaningfully be
used in the proportional model. Those results are
presented in Table 3. All models are estimated using
two-way fixed effects. Hausman tests suggest unob-
served heterogeneity—likely due to persistent depriva-
tion in some areas and persistent differences between
local political cultures (Dorling et al. 2007)—which
would induce bias if not removed. By additionally
controlling for idiosyncratic shocks in individual years,
as for instance the possible effects of the 2005 terrorist
attacks on London, the two-way fixed effects model
removes an additional source of bias. We now present
our findings from all four models.
Findings
We find support for negativity bias in several spec-
ifications. On the other hand, we do not find support
for the simple proportional response model, either
for the service performance score (Table 1, propor-
tional model) or for citizen satisfaction as measured
by the percentage of citizens stating that they are
satisfied with their local government’s service per-
formance (Table 3).
We find support for the positivity versus neg-
ativity bias model for the CPA but not for service
performance. Recall that the service performance
score is one of the two components going into a
CPA rating, the other one being based on the judg-
ments made by the Audit Commission after con-
ducting an inspection of a council. For the CPA, the
positivity versus negativity model in Table 2 shows
TABLE 3 Explaining Vote Share of the Incumbent Administration by Citizen Satisfaction
Citizen perceptions model
Lag of % of citizens very/fairly satisfied with the local government’s service performance 0.052 (0.056)
Competitiveness: difference in vote share of two biggest parties in the last election 20.233 (0.063)***
% support for current incumbent in the previous election 0.854 (0.083)***
Labour (national governing party) incumbent (dummy) 0.750 (1.452)
Liberal Democratic incumbent (dummy) 26.362 (2.700)**
Whole-council election (dummy) 29.535 (1.333)***
Average first-quarter claimant rate 0.717 (1.002)
Average home price in the financial year before the election (in £1,000) 0.014 (0.027)
Average council tax/dwelling (in £) 20.019 (0.008)**
Year dummy for 2000 2.581 (2.064)
Year dummy for 2003 1.970 (2.192)
Constant 21.254 (7.268)***
Observations 297
Number of local governments 139
F-test of H0: ‘‘The model explains nothing’’ p , .0001
R2 within .67
R2 between .31
R2 overall .43
Fixed effects results with Huber-White standard errors adjusted for clustering on each local government in parentheses. Note that the
coefficient on the constant term reflects the average local government fixed effect plus all idiosyncrasies of the 2001 election.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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that a decline by one or more stars is associated with
a two percentage point reduction in electoral support
for the incumbent administration. As there is no
relationship between an increase in the CPA and
electoral support for the incumbent at the next
election, there is evidence for negativity bias.4
The findings also support negativity bias in the
threshold model (Table 2). For illustration, we evaluate
it in two different formulations. The reward formula-
tion includes dummy variables for mediocre perform-
ance (measured by a CPA rating of two stars) and high
performance (three stars or four stars). We use it to
compare the threshold of mediocre and high perform-
ance to the baseline of low performance. In the ex-
tremes formulation, on the other hand, we change the
baseline to mediocre performance and compare it to
dummies for both low (zero stars or one star) and high
(three stars or four stars) performance.
In the reward formulation, the incumbent ad-
ministration in a council that achieves a rating of two
stars in the year before the election tends to receive
three percentage points more electoral support. In a
similar way, councils that are graded three stars or
four stars receive almost four percentage points more
electoral support. However, it is important to note
that there is no statistical difference between the two
included categories: the null hypothesis that the coef-
ficients on two stars and three or four stars are equal
is not rejected in a joint F-test (p-value 5 .66). This
suggests there is no increased reward for councils that
have higher CPA ratings than others, but that all are
similar in not being in the low-performance group,
implying a form of negativity bias. As a robustness
check, we also estimated a modified version of the
reward formulation, where the base group is made up
exclusively of council-years with low performance of
zero stars before the election. Since there are very few
of those,5 we use both zero stars and one star together
as the base group.
Similar to the reward formulation, the extremes
formulation also provides support for the presence of
negativity bias. While being in the low-performance
group (zero stars or one star) tends to hit incumbent
support by three percentage points relative to the
base group of mediocre performance (two stars),
there is no positive electoral pay-off for those
incumbent administrations achieving high perform-
ance (three stars or four stars). This finding goes
beyond the analysis of James and John (2007) who
found negativity bias in the 2003 election following
the introductory shock of the new CPA ratings. We
show how negativity bias continues to affect perform-
ance voting long after its introduction.6
The implication of the results from the threshold
model is that an incumbent administration only
receives a bonus when their local government has
received a rating of at least mediocre performance
compared to when it received a low rating. Looked
at alternatively, incumbent administrations face a
reduction in electoral support if local government per-
formance falls to low but do not receive any increase in
support if performance increases above mediocrity.
Overall our findings suggest that the electorates react
to broad levels of performance rather than more fine-
grained measures.
We examined whether the performance effects were
contingent on the tone of news coverage. We reesti-
mated all specifications of the performance models as
interactive models, with a net positive news stories score
moderating the effect of the performance indicator
on the vote share of the incumbent administration.7
However, in no case could we reject the null hypothesis
of no interaction.
In contrast, electoral competitiveness, as meas-
ured by the difference in the vote share of the two
largest parties at the last election is associated with
slightly lower support for the incumbent adminis-
tration in all models. This finding suggests that the
increasing viability of an alternative incumbent in
the local opposition is associated with lower support
for incumbents, but that the relationships between
nonproportional performance variables and electoral
4As a robustness check, we tested whether this finding is
moderated by the percentage of citizen stating that they are
satisfied with their local government’s service performance (the
core explanatory variable of the model in Table 3). Yet there is no
such interaction. This model only shows a relationship for the
CPA, as reported in the threshold model in Table 2.
5In our estimation sample, only 13 council-years received a CPA
rating of zero stars, and seven of them occurred in 2002.
6These results also hold in alternative specifications, where all but
one of the CPA categories are represented by individual dummy
variables. It is for clarity of exposition that we group both the two
lowest and the two highest categories together in the two
formulations of the threshold model.
7We analyzed the full texts of articles from the ‘‘UK National
Newspapers’’ and ‘‘UK Regional Newspapers’’ archives on the
LexisNexis Professional database. We found a total of 653 articles
discussing individual local governments’ CPA grades for each
year between the elections covered by our study. We coded each
article as either a positive or negative evaluation of the individual
local government’s performance. Intercoder reliability was .9. We
then computed a ‘‘net positive stories’’ score by subtracting the
number of negative stories from the number of positive stories.
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support are evident even in the presence of this
control.8 As might be expected, the electoral support
for the current incumbent party or coalition persists:
every 1% of the vote share that the incumbent party
or coalition gained in the last election translates into
around eight-tenth of a percent of the vote share in
this election. As this study covers a number of elections
(from 2001 in Table 3, and 2002 in Tables 1 and 2, all
up to 2007), the electoral fortunes of the national in-
cumbent, Labour, have varied. Yet we do see evidence
of punishment of the Labour incumbent in all models
bar the citizen perceptions model (Table 3). Liberal
Democrats, so far the perennial opposition party of
British politics, also receive a punishment in all models
but the positivity versus negativity models, which likely
reflects their electoral decline in the general election
period.
Whole council-elections tend to be associated
with seven to ten percentage points less support for
the incumbent administration in all but the positivity
versus negativity models. This might reflect voters’
perceptions of a greater chance of changing the
political party control of the local government when
all the candidates are up for election. There is only
some evidence in accordance with economic voting
in the threshold model in Table 2. In all other
models, the claimant rate (our proxy for general
economic conditions in the local government) is
statistically unrelated to electoral support for the
incumbent administration. Similarly, average home
prices in the financial year immediately preceding an
election are statistically unrelated to electoral sup-
port. Perhaps voters reason economic conditions are
the responsibility of other actors, such as national
government, rather than elected local governments.
Also, the incumbent administration is not punished
for the local tax rate. Only in the citizen perceptions
model (Tables 3) is it statistically related to slightly
lower electoral support for the incumbent adminis-
tration. The null finding in Tables 1 and 2 is consistent
with the largely centrally determined financial regime
for the level of local taxes which local voters seem to
recognize is not primarily the responsibility of the
local units.
Conclusions
The performance of local governments matters for
incumbent electoral support. We show this from public
authorities’ performance scores graded to a comparable
standard across local government units. However, the
aggregate vote-performance relationship, as in eco-
nomic voting, does not operate in a straightforward
fashion. Thresholds of performance are central to the
vote-performance link rather than fine-grained, linear
relationships.
Negativity bias exists. Only the difference be-
tween low performance and anything better matters
and deterioration in performance category is negatively
related to support, with no reward for improvement.
All the evidence suggests that incumbent administra-
tions do not get a reward for achieving high perform-
ance. These asymmetric relationships have implications
for the literature on performance based and economic
voting, particularly whether incentives promote re-
sponsible government. While the opposition becomes
relatively more attractive when local governments have
low performance, there is no guarantee that new
incumbents will greatly improve performance. Future
studies, rather than focusing on electorates, may need
to take into account the role of opposition as part of a
broader analysis of the incentive structures of all the
decision makers. Whether incumbent administrations
are risk averse with respect to performance because
they have few incentives to perform well would be an
important part of this analysis.
Finally, behind these findings is the impact of
institutional structures, notably for provision of in-
formation to voters and the role of electoral systems.
Published performance information is increasingly
common in the public sector and future research could
examine how voters incorporate published perform-
ance information in their judgments. In particular,
simple summary scores like those in the CPA regime
are relatively easily observed by the electorate directly
or through the media and are consistent with theories
about how voters economize on information (Aidt
2000; James and John 2007; Lupia and McCubbins
1998). However, if local voters only seem to notice bad
ratings then publishing information contributes to
negativity bias. We were not able to appraise the im-
pact of different electoral systems because these are
uniform in English local government. But economic
voting studies increasingly stress clarity of responsibility
8We also tried estimating all models as conditional models. First,
we augmented them with multiplicative terms testing whether
the performance variables are moderated by the closeness of the
previous election result (the percentage point difference in votes
between the two largest parties), yet only in two cases could the
null hypothesis of no interactions be rejected. Second, we
augmented them with additive and multiplicative terms testing
whether the performance variables are moderated by the per-
centage of total incumbent seats held by the dominant party in
the incumbent coalition, which takes on the value of 100% in
case of a administration controlled by a single party. Only in one
case could the null hypothesis of no interactions be rejected.
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as a key factor in performance-based voting (Anderson
2000, 2006; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Nadeau,
Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Powell and Whitten
1993; Sanders 2000; Stein 1990; van der Brug, van der
Eijk, and Franklin 2007; Wlezien 2004). The question
remains as to whether lessening the clarity of respon-
sibility conventionally argued to exist in the first-past-
the-post majoritarian systems alters the attribution of
blame, offering a rich set of opportunities for compa-
rative research.
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